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research for
the real world

Compensation Tournaments

In the heat of the summer,
From beach volleyball and soccer
to tennis and golf to playoffs for
the Little League World Series,
tournament play has lessons for
workplace compensation. It was
actually a 1989 presentation by Cornell’s Ronald Ehrenberg
of his paper co-authored with Michael Bognanno called “Do
Tournaments Have Incentive Effects?” that inspired me to
study compensation. I was a college sophomore in Amherst,
Mass., and the idea of paying not on the absolute level of
output (sell 100 widgets and get paid $100) but on the relative level of output (sell more than everyone else and get
paid $1,000) sounded incredibly interesting.
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are everywhere.
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The classic tournament paper by Edward Lazear and Sherwin
Rosen is now more than 30 years old. The paper, “RankOrder Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts,” was
published in the Journal of Political Economy in October
1981. Lazear and Rosen theoretically examine a situation
where individuals are paid on the basis of their rank among
a group and not necessarily on their output, a useful structure in situations where it is difficult and/or expensive to
measure individual effort well. An important characterization of the tournament payment structure, they note, is that
payment (winning the prize) depends on the rank order and
not the “distance” between the individuals’ performances.
So if one individual narrowly wins the first place prize, he/
she gets exactly the same prize as if the gap is vast between
that of the winner and that of the second place finisher.
Among their findings: When workers are “risk neutral”
(gain no thrill from the potential of winning or anxiety from
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the fear of losing), a payment scheme based on rank can
elicit precisely the same level of effort from workers as a
payment scheme perfectly matched to individual effort; this
means piece-rate pay. A tournament scheme can motivate
workers the same if workers are risk neutral. Lazear and
Rosen also showed that: 1) when workers are risk averse,
as many are, there are some circumstances when workers
might actually prefer to be paid based on rank, 2) the level
of effort a worker puts forth in a tournament depends on
the size of the prize (e.g., level of promotion and size of
associated raise) and 3) breaking employees (players) into
groups of more similar quality (e.g., leagues) has further
useful outcomes. Their seminal paper put forth a lot of
interesting findings and launched a host of empirical work.

Payments in Sports Tournaments
A rich place to study tournament pay, performance, output,
effort and the like is professional golf, because so much is
measured. Great data are available on the incentive structure; for example, the distance in dollars between the first
place price and the second place prize, and the distance in
dollars between the second place prize and the third place
prize, and so on. And, a lot is known about individuals’
output (players’ scores), and even course difficulty and
playing conditions.
Ehrenberg and Bognanno’s paper, published in the Journal
of Political Economy in 1990, studied the Professional Golf
Association tours and found strong evidence that the level
and structure of the prize system has meaningful effects on
player performance. After controlling for all sorts of details
about player quality, weather, course difficulty and a host of
other characteristics, they find that the bigger the prizes (all
else equal) the lower the scores, and the higher the “marginal
return to effort” leading to a lower score in final rounds.
Lower scores are good in golf, so this means that where there
are bigger awards in tournaments, players do better.

One such study looks at the contract payment data in
the market for broiler chickens. It turns out that in the
U.S. broiler chicken market, independent farmers are organized by large processing companies and paid based on
relative performance through a piece-rate tournament.
(See Armando Levy’s and Tomislav Vukina’s “The League
Composition Effect in Tournaments With Heterogeneous
Players: An Empirical Analysis of Broiler Contracts” in the
April 2004 Journal of Labor Economics.) The authors of this
tournament pay study emphasize that individuals could face
very different odds of doing well and earning a tournament
payoff based on whether, because of random assignment,
they face a much better or much worse competitor early
in the tournament. Many sports tournaments use seeding
to lessen this apparent random “luck of the draw.” Among
Levy’s and Vukina’s findings: There may be gains to tournaments over piece rates, but complexities like assignment of
competitors (leagues) and the effect of repeated tournaments must be considered.

Glengarry Glen Ross
One of my favorite examples of a compensation tournament comes from the movie adaptation of David Mamet’s
Pulitzer Prize winning (1984) play, “Glengarry Glen Ross.”
In the 1992 movie version, a new character was created and
Alec Baldwin played the role. In it, he screams at a team of
salespeople, confronting them with their new compensation
system. The new pay scheme is a tournament (although he
doesn’t use that word) with a first, second and third place
prize. First place prize is a Cadillac El Dorado, while second
place prize is a set of steak knives and third place prize
is “You’re fired.” This new compensation system obviously
gets employees’ attention, and it does seem to motivate. But
obviously, it also creates serious problems.

Tournament Compensation in Workplace Practice
Since these early path-breaking publications, researchers
have studied many topics related to tournament pay in the
workplace, including CEO productivity, gender equity and
disincentive possibilities in “repeated tournaments” such
as you’d find in ongoing or repeated work for the same
company. Research has also expanded to study the effects
of more sophisticated or blended tournaments such as the
piece-rate tournament where the payment is based on some
calculation of the difference between an individual’s performance and the average performance of a larger group.

got a

The Institute for Compensation Studies (ICS) at Cornell University
analyzes, teaches and communicates about monetary and nonmonetary rewards from work, and how rewards influence individuals, companies,
industries and economies. ICS research and leading-edge insight address
compensation issues challenging employers and employees in today’s dynamic
global marketplace. www.ilr.cornell.edu/ics
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Send topic suggestions to ics-ilr@cornell.edu.
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